Abstract-It is difficult to develop a program that is completely free from vulnerabilities. Despite the application of many approaches to secure programs, vulnerability exploitations occur in real-world in large numbers. Exploitations of vulnerabilities may corrupt memory spaces and program states, lead to denial of services and authorization bypassing, and leak sensitive information. Monitoring at the program code level can be a way of vulnerability exploitation detection at runtime. In this work, we propose a monitor embedding framework DESERVE (a framework for DEtecting program SEcuRity Vulnerability Exploitations). DESERVE identifies exploitable statements from source code based on static backward slicing and embeds necessary code to detect attacks. During the deployment stage, the enhanced programs execute exploitable statements in a separate test environment. Unlike traditional monitors that extract and store program state information to compare with vulnerable free program states to detect exploitation, our approach does not need to save state information. Moreover, the slicing technique allows us avoid the tracking of fine grained level of information about runtime program environments such as input flow and memory state. We implement DESERVE for detecting buffer overflow, SQL injection, and cross-site scripting attacks. We evaluate our approach for real-world programs implemented in C and PHP languages. The results show that the approach can detect some of the well-known attacks. Moreover, the approach imposes negligible runtime overhead.
INTRODUCTION
In all aspects of human life, software is now widely used to store, process, and transfer sensitive and confidential information. Unfortunately, software contains vulnerabilities at program code level. These vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain access to sensitive information and execute arbitrary code. The number of exploitation due to program code level vulnerabilities has increased over the last few years [1] . The reported financial and non-financial losses incurred due to these exploitations have been found to be huge [22] . Related stake holders often lose confidence on a deployed program due to vulnerabilities. Thus, the mitigation of vulnerability exploitations is extremely important.
Software testing is a widely used vulnerability detection technique. It identifies vulnerabilities before software deployment. The vulnerability detection techniques mainly apply static (e.g., [2, 3] ) and dynamic (e.g., [7, 9, 10] ) analyses. Static analysis aims to predict all weak points of source code without executing the program. It may identify safe statements as weak and generate some false positives. Alternatively, dynamic analysis executes a program with actual inputs, collects traces, and analyzes them. Dynamic analysis may detect vulnerabilities correctly. However, it needs to execute a program with all possible inputs to detect all vulnerabilities. Executing a program with all possible inputs may not be feasible [12] .
Even after performing extensive testing, some vulnerabilities may remain undetected. Monitoring can be a complementary way to prevent the exploitation of undetected vulnerabilities through early detection and prevention. Software monitoring detects vulnerability exploitations at runtime. Traditional monitors examine certain properties of a program to detect attacks (monitoring aspect such as the footprint of the memory layout of a program [14] ). These properties are altered after an attack input is processed by a program. A monitoring aspect for buffer overflow attack detection can be a modification of the return address of a function call, or alternation of a program's execution flow. A monitor keeps track of certain changes of program states. Whenever there is a change in the monitoring aspect, the program state of a running program is compared with a known program state to detect an attack.
Traditional monitoring approaches have two major limitations. First, attackers provide new inputs to exploit vulnerabilities. If program state checking occurs before processing of an input, the dynamic state may appear safe, yet create an attack at a later stage. If the program state checking occurs after the exploitation, attacks cannot be stopped early. Second, traditional monitors keep track of every change of monitoring aspects' value [14] . A change in monitoring aspects' value does not always introduce exploitations. Some monitoring techniques apply dynamic taint analysis to user inputs are tracked at run time. Dynamic taint analysis may introduce runtime overhead [7, 20] . We believe that by combining static and dynamic analysis we can overcome these limitations.
In this paper, we propose a vulnerability monitor embedding framework DESERVE (a framework for DEtecting program SEcuRity Vulnerability Exploitations), which identifies potential vulnerable statements in an application's source code. DESERVE This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief background on vulnerabilities and techniques that we apply to develop DESERVE. Section III briefly discusses the related works. Section IV provides the detailed overview of the DESERVE framework. Section V discusses implementation and evaluation results. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. VULNERABILITIES AND DETECTION TECHNIQUES
We first briefly discuss on three vulnerabilities (buffer overflow, SQL injection, and cross-site scripting) in Sections A-C. Among these vulnerabilities, SQL injection and crosssite scripting are well known code injection attacks. Code injection is a vulnerability exploitation technique. A malicious user injects code (SQL, JavaScript) to change the course of the execution of a program. Depending on the time of action, code injection techniques can be divided into two categories: first and second order attack. The injected code in the first order attack is executed immediately. In the second order attack, the injected code is stored in a database. When the data is fetched from the database, the attack occurs [16, 40] . The second order attack can be more devastating. Our proposed framework DESERVE can embed monitors for both first and second order attacks.
Then, we describe two basic techniques that we use to develop our framework (static slicing, runtime testing) in Sections D and E.
A. Buffer overflow (BOF)
A BOF is an implementation flaw that results in exceeding the capacity of the destination buffer while copying contents from a source buffer. The overflow modifies the content of adjacent memory locations of a destination buffer. As a result, a program state might get corrupted and the execution flow of a program can be altered by overwriting sensitive memory locations such as a return address or a stack frame pointer.
We present an example of BOF in Figure 1 . Figure 1 (a) shows a function foo that can cause a BOF. t is a character array of length two bytes. The execution of strcpy function in this code segment overflows the adjacent memory spaces. Figure 1(b) shows the status of the stack before strcpy function call. The first two bytes are reserved for the array t. After these bytes, there is an empty byte followed by a memory location having the return address of foo (reAd). We assume that the initial content of the buffers and the empty byte is zero and the reAd is 10. The execution of strcpy function overwrites the reAd with a value 4 ( Figure 1(c) ). At the end of the function execution, the program resumes the execution from the command at memory location 4 which may not be even within the valid memory space for the program. The C library functions which can introduce vulnerabilities in programs mainly copy/merge string contents, provide formatted output to a string, or take input into strings. Besides these function-calls, improper access to buffers through array indexes and pointers can cause buffer overflow. 
B. SQL injection (SQLI)
SQLI is a well-known code injection attack. To exploit an SQLI vulnerability, instead of a legitimate input, a malicious user supplies part of SQL queries in an application that alters the structure of expected queries. Database queries are generated dynamically through server side scripts. Attacker's injected code becomes part of the dynamic query and is executed by the database engine. This execution can cause an unexpected program behavior.
To explain an SQLI attack, we introduce a login example. A user can login into a web application using user name amatul and password 4test. The server script sends the following query to the database engine: Select * from User where uid='amatul' and pwd='4test'. If the user exists, the query returns one or more rows. The script checks the number of rows in the result. If the number is greater than zero, it allows the user to log in. Let 
C. Cross-site scripting (XSS)
A cross-site scripting (XSS) attack occurs when a malicious user inserts client side scripts into the input field of a web page. Later, when another user views the page, the code is executed by the web browser and an attack occurs. In an XSS attack, the malicious script is sent to the server as an HTTP GET or POST request, and an attack occurs after the execution of the response sent from the server side. Google code University [16] provides a web application Gruyere to perform and understand malicious attacks. URL http://google-gruyere.appspot.com/367839749691/snippets.g tl?uid=brie of Gruyere shows the list of snippets posted by user brie. The uid is sent to the server using a GET request. In response to this request, the server side sends back a response page showing the uid at the top of that page. To exploit the XSS vulnerability, a malicious user replaces the uid brie with a JavaScript code <script>alert('xss')</script>. A browser finds the uid as JavaScript code and executes it. This execution causes popping up a new window. By social engineering, a malicious user convinces a victim to click this modified URL.
D. Static backward slicing
Static backward slicing is a source code analysis technique that we use to identify the vulnerable statements, which can be influenced by user inputs. Backward slicing of a source code at a program point is a subset of statements from the source code, which have influence on that program point [17] . There is an example code snippet in Figure 2 . The behavior of the execution of Line 7 depends on the value of variable arr2. The statements in Lines 6, 4, 2, and 1 (shown as bold font) influence the value of arr2 directly or indirectly. To determine a backward slice, we need to define slicing criterion, C= (p, V), where p is the statement whose slice we are going to find and V is a subset of the program variables. Initially, V has the variables used in p. To determine the slice, the slicing algorithm walks backward through program statements. If a statement modifies any variable v in V, it is added to the slice. The variables in the modifying expression are being added to V. These steps are being repeated up to the starting of a function. For example, in Figure 2 , p is the statement at Line 7. V initially contains only arr2. However, arr2 is updated by the statement at Line 6. Line 6 is put in the slice and variable b is added to V. 
E. Runtime testing
Runtime testing is a unit testing which is performed during deployment. The test is initiated at a program point of a running program and performed in an isolated environment. In vivo testing is an example of runtime testing [18] . In vivo means "within the living" and is a way of performing experiments on whole or living organism as opposed to a partial or dead organism in biological science.
Similarly, a program is tested during execution at arbitrary program points. A unit testing is done in a sandboxed environment and does not affect the original program. Test results are logged for future use. Murphy et al. [18] apply in vivo testing for bug detection. Later, they apply this approach to detect vulnerabilities [19] . In vivo testing starts at arbitrary program points in a sandboxed environment and executes without hampering the course of the original program. Although we are largely motivated by the earlier work of Murphy et al., our developed runtime testing is signifcantly different. At First, we embed monitors by DESERVE framework, where the monitors initiate runtime testing. Monitors start testing vulnerable statements at predefined program points (determine by static slicing) in a separate test environment. The original program waits for safe responses from the test environment. The basic differences between in vivo testing used in [18] , [19] and our developed runtime testing are listed as follows. First, in vivo testing initiates a test at random program points. On the other hand, a monitor embedded by DESERVE initiates a test only for exploitable vulnerable statements. Second, the behavior of the original program is not influenced by the test outcome in in vivo testing. Alternatively, in our approach, the original program waits for the test completion and uses the runtime test outcome to recognize an exploitation. Third, the test result of in vivo testing is stored and used in future for test case generation and program analysis. However, we use the results of runtime testing to monitor an attack.
III. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we mainly discuss the research work which detects BOF, SQLI, and XSS through monitoring.
Lam et al. [9] propose a generalized framework for security monitoring. They propose a dynamic taint tracing framework to track the information flow of C programs for security. To reduce the information flow tracking overhead, they apply static backward and forward slicing. They also develop a tool called "Aussum" which does selective sandboxing of network application execution if the inputs are tainted. DESERVE does not need dynamic taint tracking. It applies backward slicing to recognize exploitable statements. The monitors embedded by DESERVE do not execute the original program execution in a sandbox; rather those monitors test the execution of the exploitable statement in a separate test environment. If the exploitable statement passes the test, the original program also executes the exploitable statement with full privilege. So far, DESERVE is implemented for BOF, SQLI, and XSS monitoring of C and PHP applications. It is extendable for new vulnerabilities of other programming languages.
Dalton et al. [20] employ dynamic taint analysis to determine attack symptoms during runtime. If the tainted variables are used in any vulnerable function or as a jump address, an attack may occur. They assume that any input from a user can be dangerous if that is used directly or indirectly by any library function or as a function's return address. Clause et al. [7] mark all return values from any input taking function as tainted. They use positive tainting to detect SQLI attacks. They identify all trusted strings and ensure that sensitive portions of an SQL query use only the trusted strings. Dynamic taint flow tracking can determine a tainted variable accurately. However, the tracking of the tainted flow creates huge runtime overhead. Some other works apply dynamic taint tracking to detect BOF attacks [10, 21] . We also assume that input from a user can be dangerous, if it is used in any vulnerable statement. However, we apply static backward slicing to identify if a user input is used by any buffer modifying statement.
Del Grosso et al. [3] apply genetic algorithm to generate test cases for BOF vulnerability detection. To reduce the input domain, they apply static slicing. The attack detection success of this work depends on the generation of adequate test cases. DESERVE also applies static backward slicing to determine if user inputs have any influence on a statement.
Some approaches apply boundary checking to detect a BOF attack [23] [24] [25] [26] , and keep track of memory allocations [11, 27, 28] . Akritidis et al. [29] apply both boundary checking and memory allocation tracking to detect BOF. Boundary checking for each buffer modifying statement is costly, and keeping track of memory allocation introduces storage and runtime overheads. The BOF monitor embedded by DESERVE does not check the boundary to detect a BOF attack. It tests a vulnerable statement in a test process and checks if it corrupts the buffer. It does not keep track of memory allocation.
Bandhakavi et al. [30] compare the runtime parse tree with an intended parse tree of SQL query. The intended parse tree is extracted from source code. This approach needs byte-code transformation. Buehrer et al. [31] also compare the standard parse tree of SQL and actual query to detect SQLI attacks.
Bhatia et al. [6] employ slicing to find weak points of Java web programs and suggest the fixes at development time. Our framework employs static backward slicing on PHP programs after development to find weak points and embeds monitor at those points.
Some XSS detection works compare the JavaScript code in a HTTP response to a shadow page/known list of scripts (e.g., [32] ). The XSS monitor embedded by DESERVE may not require a comparison for every HTTP response. As a result, the overhead is not introduced for each HTTP response. Wurzinger et al. [34] replace the JavaScript code with a unique ID and let malicious script execute to identify an attack. We do not alter JavaScript code to detect an attack. Kirda et al. [35] apply customized firewall rules to allow or disallow HTTP requests and responses to prevent an XSS attack. DESERVE does not require customizing firewall rules. Interested readers can see [14] for detailed discussion of the related work.
IV. METHODOLOGY
DESERVE takes a program's source code as input and provides the embedded monitoring code as output. It embeds the monitor into source code at exploitable vulnerable statements. The instrumented code is capable of monitoring itself after the deployment of a program. Figure 3 shows a high level view of the framework DESERVE. The left box denotes the framework DESERVE and the right box indicates the deployment of the instrumented source code. Figure 4 shows the three detailed steps of DESERVE. The rectangular boxes represent the steps of DESERVE. DESERVE processes an application's source code based on the consecutive steps: vulnerable statement marking, exploitable vulnerable statement marking, and code instrumentation. The thin arrows denote inputs and outputs. A thick arrow between two boxes represents that the output of the source box serves as input to the destination box.
To implement all the three steps of DESERVE, we develop three TXL programs [39] . TXL is a programming language, which is used for source transformation and analysis. To run the steps of the framework sequentially, we develop a Python script [38] . As a result, DESERVE can instrument the application source code automatically. We now discuss the three steps in detail in Sections A-C. In Section A, we define and describe the statement patterns and function calls that we consider as vulnerable statement. It also describes the way of automatically marking those statements. In Section B, we provide the details of the backward slicing to determine exploitable vulnerable 
C. Source code instrumentation
In this phase, DESERVE inserts code segment at exploitable vulnerable statements to make an application capable of self-monitoring. The inserted code segment does the following three tasks successively to detect attacks:
(i) The embedded monitor arranges a test environment to execute an exploitable vulnerable statement. This test environment may vary from language to language and vulnerability to vulnerability. For example, for BOF in C programming language, a new process may be forked. For SQLI, a replica of the original database can be created. For XSS, a virtual representation of an HTML document may be required.
(ii) The monitor tests exploitable vulnerable statement for a given input. We denote this testing as runtime testing. If the test implies no exploitation, it returns safe status with additional value to the original program. Otherwise, it returns to the original program with an exploitation notification. The testing of the exploitable statement depends on the vulnerability. To test SQLI and XSS, the monitor embedded by DESERVE matches the outcome of the exploitable statement execution with the outcome of a sample safe execution of that statement. For BOF, our monitor tests the The instrumentation is done based on the transformation rules in TXL. For each statement with XML like opening tag <vulStmnt> and closing tag </vulStmnt>, the TXL program inserts additional code. The inserted code varies from language to language. However, for a specific vulnerability of a specific language, the inserted code structure is identical. This circumstance makes the automation of code instrumentation possible using a TXL program. /*instrumentation ends*/ … … … Figure 5 . mapping_chdir of wu-ftpd-2.6.2 after instrumentation Figure 5 shows the code after instrumentation of the function mapping_chdir that is vulnerable to BOF. This instrumented source code is capable of self-monitoring. Lines 6-20 are the inserted source code. Lines 8-18 are executed in a test process. At Line 10, the exploitable statement is executed. BOF detection is done at Lines 14-16. At Line 19, the original program waits for the test process. If it receives a success status, it executes the exploitable statement at Line 20.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

A. Implementation
We have implemented the framework to detect BOF attacks in C/C++ applications and SQLI and XSS attacks in PHP applications. We choose PHP applications to evaluate the framework because 75% of web applications are developed in PHP [5] . In 2010, 27.2% of total web-based vulnerabilities have been found in PHP applications. We choose MySQL database server as it is the most popular open source database server. In the following subsections, we discuss the implementation in details. Table II shows a subset of vulnerable functions that we consider evaluating our approach. By adding entries to the vulnerable statement pattern repository, we can easily extend our framework to consider other functions. All the vulnerable functions responsible for BOF attacks modify buffer contents beyond the allocated lengths. Database access functions are called to execute a SQL query by server side scripts. More precisely, database access functions are responsible for the execution of a malicious SQL query. Therefore, the statements which have a database access function call are considered vulnerable to SQLI. Functions vulnerable to XSS write their input parameters directly in response pages. If any malicious JavaScript is used as input parameters for these functions, an XSS attack may occur. DESERVE takes the list of the vulnerable functions that generate outputs to response pages and PHP grammar as inputs in this step. 
1) Vulnerable function
2) Input taking function
In our framework implementation for BOF, we consider scanf and gets as input taking functions. If the slice of a vulnerable statement uses any user input or V has any input parameter of the executing function, we consider that vulnerable statement exploitable by a first order attack. Usually, a web application receives inputs from a user via HTTP GET/POST methods. PHP program can access these inputs using array $_GET/$_POST. Another way of receiving an input from a user is browser cookie. Cookie values can be found in array $_COOKIE. Array $_REQUEST by default contains the contents of $_GET, $_POST, and $_COOKIE. We consider that a statement utilizes user inputs, if it uses any of these arrays.
For second order SQLI and XSS attacks, a slice has statements which collect information from the database. If the slice of a vulnerable statement has a database access function, we consider the vulnerable statement exploitable. The list of PHP functions for accessing MySQL database engines and generating response pages are shown in the SQLI and XSS rows of Table II, respectively. 3) Runtime test environment For BOF exploitation detection in C/C++, we consider a forked process as a test environment. The new forked process has the same address space of the original process. We use operating system pipe for necessary inter process communications. The test process executes the exploitable vulnerable statement. As the address space of the original process and the test process are identical, after effect of the execution would be exactly the same. After the execution, the test process checks the following two conditions to detect an attack: (i) if the current buffer length is greater than the allocated size for the buffer, and (ii) if the statement execution alters the adjacent memory cell of the buffer. If any of the above conditions is true, the test process sends a failure notification to the original process. Otherwise, it sends the success notification and pushes necessary data into the pipe. The original process waits for the test completion. If it receives a success notification, it collects necessary values from the pipe. Then, the original process executes the vulnerable statement safely.
To detect an SQLI attack, we consider a replica database in a test database server as a test environment. At the beginning, the data are copied to the replica database from the original database. Therefore, the replica database and the original database have the identical data. Both databases are updated with the same data for the safe SQL update operations. In the worst case, malicious SQL code can delete database tables; delete the database; and shutdown the server. In our setup, any destructive SQL command is executed first on the test database. The embedded monitor can detect the attack and the SQL command is not executed in the original database. Thus, even for a malicious SQL script, the original application database remains untouched. The monitor executes the exploitable database access functions on a replica database to detect an attack. If the statement executes safely, we execute the SQL in the original database. To identify a safe execution, we check the following conditions: (i) Does the execution generate any error? (ii) Are the numbers of fetched, added, edited, and deleted data rows greater than the thresholds? (iii) Are the numbers of fetched, added, edited, and deleted objects greater than the thresholds? If any of the above conditions is false, the SQL query execution is not safe, and it is not executed in the original database. For each exploitable statement, DESERVE needs to know the threshold values. The thresholds are the maximum numbers of fetched, added, edited, and deleted data rows and objects which are returned from the database after the safe execution of an exploitable statement. DESERVE takes these values as inputs during the processing of a source code. The threshold values can be extracted from the expected behavior of the application.
For XSS exploitation detection in PHP, we arrange a test inside a PHP program using a DOMDocument object [41] . PHP DOMDocument object can be created from string and represents an entire HTML document. PHP DOMDocument object represents an entire HTML document. It provides functions and properties to access HTML tags individually. The framework creates a DOMDocument object $doc using the input parameters of an exploitable statement. The framework creates another DOMDocument object $docexpected using sample expected values for those parameters. The sample expected values are asked to be entered during the source code instrumentation. Let us consider that the set of HTML tags in $doc is S and in $docexpected is E. The number of elements in S and E are |S| and |E|, respectively. After creating two DOMDocument objects, we check the following conditions: |S| = |E| and S = E. If any of these conditions fails, the echo/print function is not safe and the function is not executed.
B. Results
1) Exploitable statements
We evaluate our framework using three well known C applications having BOF vulnerabilities: wu-ftpd-2.6.2 [37] The detailed results of exploitable SQLI attack related statements are shown in Table IV . We notice that the percentage of statements varies between 21 and 63. Similarly, the detail statistics of exploitable statements for XSS attack is presented in Table V . For the first order XSS attack, the percentage of exploitable vulnerable statements ranges between 6.4 and 28. For the second order XSS attack, the percentage of exploitable statements varies from 0 to 33.
2) Code increase
The instrumentation increases the line of code. Table VI shows the overhead of additional Line of Code (LOC) after the instrumentation. The overall LOC increase due to the instrumentation of the BOF is between 1.2% and 2.15%.For the first order SQLI attack monitoring, the size of the source code is increased by 3.3%-4%. For the second order SQLI attack detection, 2.1%-8.5% additional code is needed. For the first order XSS attacks detection, the additional line of code instrumentation is 10%-25% of the total line of code. The LOC is increased due to the instrumentation ranges between 2% and 19% for the second order XSS attacks. Kieyzun et al. [4] also use SchoolMate, WebChess, and FAQforge to evaluate their tool ARDILLA which can detect weak points of PHP/MySQL applications for SQLI and XSS attacks using taint analysis. Then the tool recognizes proper input set to exploit those weak points. They list the weak points of these three applications 1 . We consider the list as a benchmark to evaluate the SQLI and XSS monitors. We match the exploitable statements list with the weak points list for SQLI attacks and observe that our framework can detect all of the weak points successfully. We observe that our framework detects most of the weak points for XSS attacks successfully. Very few weak points (four exploitable statements for the first order XSS attacks and one exploitable statement for the second order XSS attack for SchoolMate) are not detected as a global variable is involved in the slice. DESERVE cannot determine a slice across multiple files.
4) Runtime overheads
As we apply runtime testing to detect exploitation, the monitor has runtime overhead. The overhead is constant and introduces almost the same delay before each exploitable vulnerable statement execution. We use Dell optiplex 980, Intel core i7 @ 2.80 GHz quad core machine as the evaluation environment. With this system specification, for a safe input to an exploitable statement, the monitor introduces only 0.78 microsecond delays for BOF monitoring. For a moderate size input, which introduces BOF, the monitor needs 2.5 milliseconds to handle the overflow.
For monitoring each exploitable statement for SQLI attack, an application needs an additional database access and some comparisons. If the time for accessing database once is t and the time for comparisons is c, theoretically, the execution time of each exploitable statement will be 2t+c. Therefore, for each exploitable statement, the embedded monitor needs t+c unit additional time. With this system specification, for each exploitable statement, the monitor introduces a maximum delay of 8 microseconds.
For monitoring each statement which is exploitable by XSS attack, we need two DOMDocument objects creation overhead. Also, our approach introduces overhead for comparing two DOMDocument objects. The monitor introduces 0.5 microsecond delays to compare the largest DOMDocument objects from SchoolMate, WebChess, and FAQforge.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a monitor embedding framework DESERVE to combine the benefit of static analysis and testing. Our monitor embedding framework and monitoring technique use static analysis (static backward slicing) and dynamic analysis (runtime testing). We define DESERVE in a way such that it can be easily extendable for new languages and for new vulnerabilities. DESERVE can embed monitors to detect BOF, SQLI, and XSS vulnerabilities of the applications implemented in C/C++ and PHP. The monitors can successfully detect some attacks. The XSS and SQLI monitors can effectively detect both first and second order code injection attacks. The framework identifies the exploitable statements from source code and embeds a monitor into the source code. The embedded monitor detects an attack using runtime testing. It executes the exploitable statement in a separate process. We implement the proposed framework and apply it to detect BOF, SQLI, and XSS attacks in real-world applications. We evaluate DESERVE based on real-world programs vulnerable to attacks. The evaluation results indicate that the approach can effectively detect attacks with reasonable overhead in terms of execution time.
Our future work plan includes exploring several directions. The static slicing may causes some false positives. Currently, we include a statement to a slice, if the modified expression has any variable that is used in any of the statements in the current slice. However, all the variables in a modifying expression may not necessarily change the modified variables. We plan to employ the advance slicing technique (e.g., interprocedural slicing) to resolve this issue. To find exploitable vulnerable statements for second order code injection, we assume that any input from the database which is used in vulnerable statement is dangerous. This assumption can lead to some false positives. We plan to remove these cases. Due to language constraints, sometimes manual intervention is necessary while embedding monitors. For example, C/C++ programs may have pre-processor directives which are difficult to process automatically by the existing slicing algorithm. Thus, we would like to improve our framework to address it. Finally, we want to expand the framework implementation for content sniffing and crosssite request forgery related vulnerabilities.
